Background {#Sec1}
==========

Personal health record (PHR) (Zuckerman and Kim [@CR18]; Koufi et al. [@CR5]) contains massive private data in terms of the user's health conditions, disease history, medication and other personal information. Due to the capability of improving the efficiency of healthcare, PHR has gained increasingly popularity nowadays and has been widely applied in the medical area such as diseases rehabilitation, disease prevention (McInnes and Shimada [@CR10]), medical treatment, etc. Considering the private nature of PHR (Price et al. [@CR11]), special encryption techniques should be implemented for protection in the PHR system (Liu et al. [@CR9]; Sangeetha et al. [@CR13]).

Ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) (Goyal et al. [@CR2]; Waters [@CR16]) was proposed by Waters in 2006 and has been considered suitable for access control for PHR system, since it reduces the encryption cost for PHR data owner and can also provide flexible self-centric data access management (Hong and Sun [@CR3]; Fuji and Abbott [@CR1]) at the same time. Unlike identity based cryptosystem (Li and Khan [@CR6]), in CP-ABE, user's access privileges are defined by a set of attributes. A user can read the ciphertext on condition that the attributes he owns match with the policy (Price et al. [@CR11]; Hong et al. [@CR4]). An illustration of ciphertext access policy is shown in Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}, the PHR data owner may not know the exact identity of users who have the privileges to access the data, but can describe those using attributes such as "family members", "Nurse". For instance, if a user owns the attributes of {Hospital 1, Physician}, then he can get access to the PHR data since the attributes he possesses satisfy with the access structure illustrated in Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}.Fig. 1An CP-ABE access control structure for PHR data

Many schemes have applied attribute based encryption to design medical care systems such as PHR (Qian et al. [@CR12]; Liu et al. [@CR8]; Li et al. [@CR7]; Xhafa et al. [@CR17]) and BAN (Tan et al. [@CR14]; Tian et al. [@CR15]), but the efficiency is still unsatisfactory. One important factor is that a PHR user has to run many times of bilinear pairing operations when decrypting a ciphertext. When PHR users get access to the encrypted data using mobile devices with restricted computing resources such as cellphones, body area sensors, smart watches, the heavy decryption computation will add difficulty in the process of mobile PHR data sharing.

Key abuse is another obstacle to apply attribute based encryption to PHR system. ABE is an advanced type of broadcast encryption, users owing the same attributes share the same private key. However at the same time, a malicious user may expose his private key deliberately without being detected. Thus, a mechanism which provides user accountability and traitor tracing should also be introduced.

Based on the previous works (Liu et al. [@CR8]; Tan et al. [@CR14]; Li et al. [@CR7]; Tian et al. [@CR15]; Xhafa et al. [@CR17]; Li and Khan [@CR6]; Hong and Sun [@CR3]), to better solve the problems described above and help users achieve secure data sharing in mobile PHR system, the following constructions are established:

Firstly, we propose a user accountable ciphertext policy attribute based encryption without pairings (UA-CPABE-WP) for mobile PHR system. In our UA-CPABE-WP, users can recover the plaintext on condition that the possessing attributes satisfy with the access policy.

Secondly, the mechanism of user accountability is introduced. If a malicious PHR user exposes his private key for illegal data sharing, his identity can be accurately pinpointed by the system manager.

Thirdly, no bilinear pairing are needed during data sharing, hence relieving the mobile terminal devices from large calculation.

Our studies {#Sec2}
===========

Implementation of the proposed UA-CPABE-WP {#Sec3}
------------------------------------------

The implementation example of our scheme can be illustrated in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}. It consists of 6 entitles: AA (Attribute authority), PHR data center, data owner and receiver. Base station and data center are hardware architectures which are responsible for mobile communications and file storage. AA generates attribute private key for each user in the system. PHR data center stores massive PHR data and responds to user's data access request. Data owner and receiver are the two sides of communication, data owner encrypts the file with an access structure, while a receiver can decrypt the ciphertext using mobile devices if the attributes he owns match with the access structure. Tracer can pinpoint the exact identity of the traitor who leaks his private key deliberately.Fig. 2The implementation of our UA-CPABE-WP

Constructions {#Sec4}
-------------

Before introducing the formulized definitions of our scheme, some notations are defined in Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} for the convenience and clearness of description.Table 1Notations and their corresponding meaningsNotationMeaningNotationMeaningAAAttribute authority*PK*Public parameters*MK*System master key*A* ~*i*~A single attribute *iMK* ~*id*~User's private key*id*User's identity*CT*Ciphertext*M*Plaintext

Our UA-CPABE-WP includes the following algorithms:
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*Private key generation*: AA assigns a global unique identifier for each user in the PHR system. For a PHR user (without loss of generality, denote his identity by *id*) possessing attribute set *S*, AA generates his private key *SK*~*id*~ as follows:$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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*Encrypt*: When a data owner wants to share his private PHR data with some people processing certain attributes, he works as described below:
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*Decrypt*: Upon receiving *CT*, data receiver calculates:$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Correctness proof:
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Results and discussion {#Sec5}
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Security proof {#Sec6}
--------------

### **Theorem** {#d30e2018}

*UA-CPABE-WP is secure under chosen message attack if CDH assumption holds*.

### *Proof* {#d30e2026}
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The detail proof follows from that in (Liu et al. [@CR8]).

PHR user accountability {#Sec7}
-----------------------

When a malicious user (denote *mid* as his unique identity and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Efficiency evaluation {#Sec8}
---------------------

In this section, we will compare the efficiency of our scheme with other schemes which have also applied attribute based encryption to medical systems. In this report, the *Encrypt* algorithm will take $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Since the computation cost of bilinear pairing is much larger than that of multiplication and addition, it can be seen that the efficiency of our UA-CPABE-WP is higher since no bilinear pairings are needed.

Conclusion {#Sec9}
==========

In this report we provide a high efficient data sharing method using attribute based encryption with user accountability (UA-CPABE-WP). In our scheme, data owner can achieve secure and self-centric access control over the PHR data. Besides, the mechanism of user accountability is introduced. If a malicious PHR user exposes his private key for illegal data sharing, his identity can be pinpointed exactly. The better efficiency and security makes UA-CPABE-WP to be a promising method for data protection in mobile PHR system.

All the authors contributed equally to this work. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Authors' information {#FPar1}
====================

Dr Zhixin Sun is the dean of Internet of Things institute, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications. He has published more than 50 literatures on journals worldwide. His research area includes information security, computer networks, computer science, etc. Dr Hanshu Hong is a PHD candidate in Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications. His research area includes information security, cryptology. Dr Di Chen is a PHD candidate in Genetics at the Pennsylvania State University, he works in the Huck Institutes of the Life Sciences. His work engages statistical modeling and bioinformatics tools to explore the regional variation of mutation rate in human genome.

Acknowledgements {#FPar2}
================

This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60973140, 61170276 and 61373135).The authors thank the sponsors for their support and the reviewers for their helpful comments.

Competing of interest {#FPar3}
=====================

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
